Part I Derivation of Comparative Statics for the Lottery Competition Model and a Continuous Time Model of States' Utilities
We begin this part of the appendix by deriving comparative statics for our strategic theory of policy diffusion specialized to the case of lottery adoptions for a two-state (r and s) system. In particular, we determine the marginal effect of six parameters on the probability that one of the states, say s, adopts a lottery (π s ): s's cost of adoption (c s ), r's cost of adoption (c r ), and four variables reflecting a state's conditional revenue gain from adopting a lottery: δ s (0) [s's revenue gain as a monopoly provider], δ s (1) [s's revenue gain under competition], δ r (0) [r's revenue gain as a monopoly provider], and δ r (1) [r's revenue gain under competition]. To derive comparative statics, we begin by separating the problem into two distinct scenarios from the point of view of one of the states, say s. The first is that s's neighbor, r, has previously adopted; the second is that r has not adopted.
Consider the first scenario, in which r has adopted a lottery in a previous period. Since we have assumed that r cannot "disadopt," the only decision belongs to s, and s's choice is fairly simple. Given equation (3), which writes π s as a function of Δ s , specifying π s (1) requires only that we derive Δ s (1).
When r has already adopted, the change in utility for adopting, Δ s (1), takes a particularly simple form: 
Comparative statics are easy to compute in this case, and yield an unsurprising result. Since Δ s (1) = δ s (1) -c s , s's utility gain from adopting [Δ s (1)] is increasing in its revenue gain from adopting [δ s (1)] and decreasing in its cost of adoption (c s ). It follows from equation (3) that s's probability of adopting is also increasing in δ s (1) and decreasing in c s . The problem is more complex when r has not yet adopted. Now s must not only worry about its own gains and losses; it must anticipate r's adoption decision, since the states' decisions are coupled. Formally, we can write
A similar equation may be written for Δ r (0), with r and s subscripts flipped. Due to the dependence of π s (0) on π r (0), and vice versa, when trying to discern how the probability of adoption varies with the revenue parameters ( b~) it is necessary to understand not only the direct effect of parameter variation on the probability of adoption, but also the indirect effect arising from a change in the other state's probability of adoption. This reflects the strategic nature of the interaction.
Simple inspection of equation (A2) indicates that the direct effect of increasing each of δ s (1) and δ s (0) is to increase Δ s (0), which in turn-by equation (3)-increases π s (0), while the direct effect of increasing c s is to decrease this probability. But this does not take into account changes in the equilibrium value of π r (0). As δ s (1) -δ s (0) is multiplied by π r (0) in equation (A2), there are four cases to consider:
1 We analyze each in order.
In case (i), an increase in π s (0) increases π r (0), which increases π s (0), and so on. Formally, this means that the game played by the two states has strategic complementarities, which implies that equilibrium values of π s (0) and π r (0) are both increasing in any parameter that increases either one. In fact, increasing each of δ s (1), δ s (0), δ r (1), and δ r (0), and decreasing either c s and c r increases both π s (0) and π r (0) in equilibrium. This same logic does not hold in the remaining two cases. For example, in case (iii), an increase in π s (0) decreases π r (0), which decreases π s (0), which increases π r (0), and so on. To derive comparative statics for these cases, we directly calculate them by differentiating the Logit Equilibrium correspondence for state s, making sure to keep track of the implicit dependence of the equilibrium value of π r (0) on δ s (1), δ s (0) and c s , and the same for π s (0) on δ r (1), δ r (0) and c r . After some algebra, this procedure yields the following set of comparative statics: 
In cases (iii) and (iv), the shared denominator of the six derivatives is always positive, implying that the sign of the numerator provides the sign of the respective comparative static. We see that in both cases π s (0) is increasing in δ s (1) and δ s (0), and decreasing in c s . In case (iii), π s (0) is increasing in δ r (1) and δ r (0), and decreasing in c r ; while in case (iv), π s (0) is decreasing in δ r (1) and δ r (0), and increasing in c r . This analysis yields the summary results on page 14 of the paper.
To facilitate analysis in the paper we assume adoption decisions by governments that occur in discrete intervals. However, in general, governments' decision-making processes occur in continuous time. In the remainder of this part of the appendix, we briefly specify continuoustime utilities for governments, intended to be a jumping-off point for further work.
In this continuous time model, the utility each government derives from all actions is continuously decreasing according to a factor, ρ s . Given this notation, we can state that if s is rational, it will adopt at time t only if adopting makes its discounted expected utility looking forward from time t, U s,t , greater than its discounted utility from not adopting, where 
Part II Derivation of Spatial Expectations
This section offers a more technical version of the theoretical defense for the three expectations about competition presented in the section, "Expectations from the Lottery Competition Model."
Additional Technical Assumptions
Footnote 5 notes that additional technical assumptions are needed to derive the expectations that form the basis for an empirical test of our theory in the context of state lottery adoptions. In particular, we assume that monopoly lottery provision does not yield too high a revenue when lottery adoption is sufficiently likely. Formally, for the Offensive Competition Expectation and the Anticipatory Competition Expectation to hold, the following conditions must be met:
where ν 1 , ν 2 , and ν 3 (0 ≤ ν i ≤ 1) represent differences in the magnitude of the shifts in parameters δ s (0), δ s (1) and δ r (1), respectively, with increases in the size of r's population living within D miles of s relative to the total population of s; 3 and the μ 1 , μ 2 , and μ 3 (0 ≤ μ i ≤ 1) represent differences in the magnitude of the shifts in parameters δ s (1), δ r (0) and δ r (1), respectively, with increases in the size of s's population living within D miles of r relative to the total population of s. (These six shifts in magnitude cannot be calculated without specifying a model of individual consumer behavior, though we can determine relative magnitudes in a few cases.) If π s (0) and π r (0) are small, as they are in the empirical case of lottery adoptions by American states, then conditions (B1) and (B2) hold as long as δ s (0) -δ s (1) is positive and neither this difference nor the level of rationality, λ, is too big or too small. When the gains to monopoly lottery provision are too great or states are too strongly rational (λ very high), anticipation of the other state's preemptive adoption to prevent one's likely poaching diminishes too greatly a state's desire to poach. When states are too weakly rational (λ very low), they fail to anticipate the other state's likely adoption and adopt more often than is optimal. In this sense, a test of the Anticipatory Competition Hypothesis amounts to a test of the assumption that states consider other states' equilibrium behavior in formulating their own actions. Conditions (B1) and (B2) are also more likely to hold the larger are the shifts in the two terms reflecting revenue gains from a monopoly lottery adoption (μ 2 and ν 1 ) relative to the shifts in the four terms reflecting revenue gains from an adoption under competition (μ 1 , μ 3 , ν 2 and ν 3 ).
Spatial Expectations
Given conditions (B1) and (B2), we turn to an examination of two regions of interest: the portion of s that is within D miles of r (to be called s's border region), and the portion of r that is within D miles of s (to be called r's border region). Increasing the proportion of s's population in its own border region has two effects on revenue. First, it should decrease A s b~(1) since more 3 Recall that D is the maximum distance someone would be willing to travel to play the lottery. interested individuals of s should play r's lottery, decreasing s's revenue. Second, it should decrease A s b (1) by increasing the importance of s's border region to the overall revenue of s, thereby leading s to increase its competitive effort. At the extreme, if no one lived in s's border region, s could behave as a monopoly lottery producer, earning maximal revenues. In contrast, the proportion of s's population in its own border region has no effect on either 
b~(1).
If the person is moved to s's side of cutline, then the incentive to shift the cutline is r's. If the cutline is in s, then the same argument may be made for r's choice of a competitive level: r would never choose a level of competition that would cause a decrease in revenues more than would be gained from the addition of one lottery player. Since r's gain is a loss to s, and since we have assumed it is cheaper for s to compete for an individual in s than it is for r to compete for that individual, we again have that the decrease in A s b (1) resulting from the individual's being moved must be less than the decrease in A s b~(1) resulting from the same shift of the individual. Finally, if the cutline is in r, then moving one interested individual in s can have no marginal effect on r's desire to compete in equilibrium, since r has already deemed it not to be beneficial to compete for individuals in s in this case. Thus, we have that δ s (1)-s's revenue gain from a lottery adoption under competition-is increasing in the proportion of s's population in its own border region. This leads to our first spatial expectation:
Defensive Competition Expectation: If r has a lottery, the probability that s will adopt one is positively related to the proportion of its adult population within D miles of r (and thus with access to r's lottery). Now consider the impact of an increase in the population in r's border region relative to the population of s. If s has no lottery, this increase has no effect on s's revenue, regardless of whether r has a lottery; i.e., the increase has no effect on b (1) due to additional players, perhaps because it is cheaper for r to compete for individuals living in the two states' border regions than it is for s. (Our conclusions hold more strongly if this assumption is not true, so the assumption is unimportant.) The only time there is an incentive for either state to increase competition in this case is when the cutline is in r. But by the same argument introduced earlier regarding the proportion of s's population in its own border region, the decrease in (1), and since an increase in the population in r's border region relative to the population of s has no effect on b~(1), the increase in δ s (0) can never be less than the decrease in δ s (1). For fixed populations of s and r, however, increasing the population in r's border region relative to the population of s also increases the proportion of r's total population in its own border region. Thus, we cannot fully understand the effect on s of the population in r's border region relative to the population of s until we understand the effect of the size of this population relative to r's total population on r.
Earlier we saw that increasing the proportion of s's population in its own border region decreases both To untangle effects, we consider the net change to the parameters due to a change in the proportion of individuals in each region. First consider r's border population. As we have seen, increasing this population relative to the population in s increases δ s (0), decreases δ s (1) but to a lesser degree, and increases δ r (1). One can use the comparative statics derived in Part I of this on-line appendix to determine the net effect of marginal changes in these parameters arising from an increase in the population in r's border region relative to the population of s. Given the relative rarity of lottery adoptions absent other states' prior adoptions-implying low probabilities that r and s will adopt when neither state has a lottery [i.e., low values of π s (0) and π r (0)]-we believe that assumptions (B1) and (B2) are likely to hold. Accordingly, these comparative statics imply that the net effect of increasing the population in r's border region relative to the population of s will be to increase the likelihood that s will adopt. This leads to a second spatial expectation:
Offensive Competition Expectation: If r does not have a lottery, the probability that s will adopt one is positively related to the number of adults in r who are within D miles of s relative to the adult population of s. Now reconsider s's border region. Increasing the proportion of s's population in this region increases δ s (1) and δ r (0), and decreases δ r (1). Again we can compute the net effect of a marginal increase in the proportion of s's population in its own border region on the probability that it will adopt using our comparative statics. This time our assumptions imply a decrease in the probability of adoption, leading to a third spatial expectation: Anticipatory Competition Expectation: If r does not have a lottery, the probability that s will adopt one is negatively related to the proportion of its adult population within D miles of r (i.e., the proportion of s's population that would have access to a lottery in r if r were to adopt one). Note: All columns report coefficients from models in which one or both of our "learning variables" are added to the models estimated in Table 1 of the JOP article. Z-statistics based on robust standard errors (obtained using the probit procedure in Stata 9) are in parentheses below coefficients. *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (one tailed) 
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